Scishare: A Secure P2P Information Sharing Tool

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Outline

- Requirements

- System architecture

- Meeting the security requirements

    – PKI-based peer-to-peer security

- Software implementation

Requirements

- Share local data
  - Keeps data in owner's hands
  - Allows faster access to updates
    - Don't have to wait for transfer to repository
  - Central repository is no longer a requirement
    - Better scalability and fault-tolerance of system
    - Easier to consolidate existing information stores
  - Easy-to-use fine-grained access control interface is a must

Requirements

- Allow for extensible search
  - Search important feature for information systems
    - Where would the web be without search engines
  - Extensibility important
    - Goal is not to create a data representation standard
    - Allow different disciplines/applications to use the query language and data representation they are familiar with
    - Don't require translation of existing information to use the system

Requirements

- Security
  - Confidentiality and integrity of communication
  - Fine-grained access control to resources

- Support ad hoc collaborations
  - Meetings at conferences
  - Requires flexible security model
   - Quick and easy startup
    - Trust building

Requirements

- Reach a wide community
  - Run on many OS and architectures
- Do it all in short time with limited personnel
  - Need to use existing technology whenever possible

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Scishare Architecture

Outline

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Security Goals

- Confidentiality and integrity of communication

- Fine-grained access control to resources

- Support ad hoc collaborations

- Assumption
  - X.509 identity certificates

Approach

- Use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
  - X509 certification/online CAs
  - Flexible Trust Models
  - Reduces Key Management issues
- Use existing PKI-based security technologies
  - Modifications are external
  - Reduce the risk of introducing security holes

Traditional Security Model

- Authorized users are predefined
  - In or out (of system)
  - Harder to meet 'new people' online in a collaboration
- Policies are managed by third party entities (administrators)
  - Valid in many use cases
  - Hard to start a spontaneous collaboration
    - Setup takes time
  - Hard to invite a person to an established collaboration
    - Must contact resource administrators
- Security becomes a nuisance
  - Users may resort to insecure solutions

A Flexible Security Model

- Partition the collaboration into two types of **secure** components:
  - Public
    - Capture users' identities
    - Gradual trust in the collaboration
    - Turn off public components => traditional model
  - Protected
    - Authorized users only
    - Give invitation/escort powers to some of these users
- Example of components:
  - Communication channels, online instruments, chat rooms, shared spaces, files, …

Components in scishare

- ## Unicast channels
  - Managed by the users participating in the communication

- ## Multicast channel
  - Managed by 'Third-Party administrators'

- ## Files and metadata
  - Managed by individual users

Securing Unicast

- Secure communication channel (SSL)
  - Confidentiality
  - Integrity
  - Authentication
    - Typically only server presents X509 certificate
    - Require both parties to present X509 certificate (mutual authentication)
      - Every user needs a certificate

Securing Unicast

- Provide users with pseudo (self-signed) X509 certificates if they don't have any
- Custom trust manager
  - Accepts any valid chain
  - Marks users as trusted if user and chain verify
  - Remember un-trusted users
    - Can later authorize un-trusted users based on experience
- A single channel can handle both protected and public traffic
  - Simplifies development

Securing Multicast

- Need a secure group communication channel with properties similar to SSL:

  - implements an authenticated and encrypted group channel

  - enables group members to establish a session key

  - certificate-based access control

Securing Multicast

- Public group communication channel
  - Every user can join

- Protected group communication channel
  - Fine-grained access control
    - Join, invite, escort
    - Capabilities
      - Short lived, signed by the enforcers
    - Invitations/Escorts
      - Short lived, signed by authorized users

- A single communication channel
  - A protected channel over a public one (sub-group)

Securing Data and Metadata

- Provide a simple high level interface to users
  - Manage policies
  - Manage groups
- Authorization engine is used underneath (e.g. Akenti)
  - Distributed groups
  - User revocation
  - Future complex expressions
    - Time of day, …

Read More About It

K. Berket, A.Essiari and A. Muratas

PKI-Based Security for Peer-to-Peer Information Sharing

Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, Zurich, Switzerland, Aug. 25-27, 2004.

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Build on Existing Tools

- ## XML messaging
  - JAXB to generate code from schema

- ## Securing the group communication channel
  - Secure Group Layer (SGL)
  - InterGroup

- ## Authorization engine
  - Akenti

Security at the Multicast-Transport Layer

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                         │
│        Collaborative Application        │
│                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    ↕

┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│    Group DH      ┊                      │
│  key exchange    ┊   Access control     │    Secure Group
│   algorithm      ┊     algorithm        │     Layer (SGL)
│ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ │
│    Symmetric cryptographic algorithms   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    ↕

┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│         Reliable Multicast              │
│         Transport Protocol              │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

The Reliable Multicast Transport Layer

- ## Provide SGL with reliable and ordered delivery of messages

  - data messages are delivered in order - FIFO, partial, and total - at each member of the group

- ## Provide SGL with membership notifications

  - membership changes delivered in order with respect to data messages

- ## Several systems provide a reliable multicast layer

  - e.g., Totem and InterGroup

The Secure Group Layer

- Symmetric crypto algorithms
  - implement an authenticated and encrypted channel
- A group key-exchange cryptographic primitive enables group members to establish a session key
- A certificate-based access control mechanism makes sure that only the legitimate parties have access to the session key
  - off-line (does not participate in key exchange)

Group Key-Exchange

- Up-flow: U_i raises received values to the power of x_i and forwards to U_{i+1}
- Down-flow: U_n processes the last up-flow and broadcasts

$$[g, g^{x1}]$$

x_1

x_2

$$[g^{x_2 x_3}, \quad g^{x_1 x_3}]$$

$$[g^{x_2}, g^{x_1}, g^{x_1 x_2}]$$

$$sk = g^{x_1 x_2 x_3}$$

x_3

Akenti Distributed Authorization

- Target widely distributed environments
  - Resources (instruments, executables, …)
  - Principals:
    - Resource owners (stakeholders)
    - User-Attribute Issuers
    - Users
- Collaborative/Grid environments that could span many autonomous/dispersed organizations.
- Provide a flexible and secure way for stakeholders to remotely and independently define authorization policy and allow fine-grained access control.

Software Architecture

Local

- Add/remove files in DB

- Synchronize DB with file system

- Map different policies to metadata and data

Sharing

- View incoming queries

- View file uploads

Search - Transfer

- Create basic and advanced queries

- Start a search

- Group search results based on the same hash

- Display the origin of the metadata and its trustworthiness

- Allow user to download portions of a file in parallel

- Display the origin of the file and its trustworthiness

Manage CAs

CAInfo Manager

Certificate Authorities:

/ DC=org/ DC=DOEGrids/ OU=Certific

NEW
VIEW
DELETE

OK   CANCEL

URL Panel

Protocol   ldap

Host   ldap.doegrids.org

Port   389

Base   /dc=doegrids,dc=org   BROWSE

Hints:

ldap://ldap.doegrids.org:389/dc=doegrids,dc=org

OK   Cancel

LDAP Panel

Enter a base: dc=doegrids,dc=org

CN contains:

OK   Cancel

Manage User Identity

User Identities

Running Scishare as: PSEUDO USER

PSEUDO USER
CN=Artur Muratas 208666, OU=People, D

New
Delete

OK   C

User Info

Keyfile Name: ocuments\cert\artur.p12   BROWSE

Keyfile Password: *************

OK   Cancel

View Un-trusted Users

Untrusted Users

Untrusted Users:

CN=Artur Muratas 208666, OU=Peopl

Delete
View

OK

Certificate Viewer

Issued To

Common Name (CN)   Artur Muratas 208666
Organization (O)   <No Part Of Certificate>
Organizational Unit (OU)   People
Serial Number   586

Issued By

Common Name (CN)   DOEGrids CA 1
Organization (O)   <No Part Of Certificate>
Organizational Unit (OU)   Certificate Authorities

Validity

Issued On   Thu Oct 02 13:16:21 GMT-08:00 20...
Expires On   Fri Oct 01 13:16:21 GMT-08:00 2004

Close

Manage Policies

Policy Manager

Policies:

PUBLIC
PRIVATE
TRUSTED
policy_1
policy_2

NEW
EDIT
DELE

OK

Policy Editor

Policy: policy_2

Groups:

group2

Rejected Users:

ratas 208666,/CN=DOEGrids CA 1]

NEW
EDIT
DELETE

NEW
DELETE

OK

OK

Manage Groups

Group Manager

Groups:

group1
group2

NEW
EDIT
DELETE

OK

Input

Enter a group name:

group1

OK   Cancel

Group Editor

Local Group: group1

Users:

[/CN=Karlo Berket 648849,/CN=DOE

NEW
DELETE

OK

On-going Work

- Performance measurements (security impact, scalability, etc.)

- Remote groups

- Securing the queries

- Providing access control to search group

More Information

- Project page:
  http://www.dsd.lbl.gov/P2P/file-share

- Software download:
  http://www.dsd.lbl.gov/scishare

- E-mail: kberket@lbl.gov